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In contrast to modern federations, the federalization of the EU has taken place 
without a constitutional answer to the question of the system’s democratic le-
gitimacy. The process of compound polity building under the shadow of the 
dilemma of the Union’s finalité politique can be described as “hidden fede-
ralism”. The major consequence of this process has been a gradual migration 
of decision-making from an intergovernmental toward a supra-governmental 
power-holder. On the one hand, due to an excessive Europeanization of go-
verning tasks, national democratic institutions have lost the political autono-
my necessary for shaping the relation between state and society, politics and 
the market, and individual and collective autonomy within member states. 
On the other hand, reforming the EU by creating democratically suspicious 
control mechanisms within its members’ budget policies has not substituted 
the absence of the EU’s governance autonomy to regulate politically sensitive 
fields such as fiscal, employment and social policies. With the escalation of 
the Eurozone crisis it has become evident that neither member states nor the 
EU have a sufficient level of autonomy to make policy choices related to the 
most sensitive issues of distributive justice. The implementation of the Fis-
cal Compact will decisively affect economic and social life in Europe; yet 
it is hardly possible to discern who should take credit or the blame for the 
nontransparent penalty mechanism embedded in this contract and aimed at 
regaining the Eurozone’s stability. In this new historical context, institutions 
of constitutional democracy, being present on the national and to an extent on 
the European level, have been deprived of their original purpose. Instead of 
making power visible and accountable, they have actually enlarged the scope 
of an unaccountable power by maintaining the illusion that citizens can still 
determine their collective destiny through the political process. 
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Introduction
Today, after sixty years of European integration, the European Union is confronting 
a dilemma – How to go further? This is, however, not the first time that it has faced 
such a question. On the contrary, this question is typical for the form of integration 
undertaken by the EU. This type of integration is characterized by two features: the 
integration on the surface is calm and evolutionary, efficient, but almost impercepti-
ble, while in its heart it is ambitious and uncertain, very strategic and almost fateful. 
The best illustration of the double face of the integration process – both the manifest 
and hidden sides – is its founding document, Schuman’s Declaration (1950), which 
encompasses a spectrum of institutions from the modest Steel and Coal Commu-
nity to a federal government at the deeper end of the process. What Jean Monnet 
projected on the basis of the Declaration was the concretization of the double face 
strategy: first, peaceful integration would be developed until it fulfills two declared 
aims – peace and welfare; second, in order to ensure the durability of peace and wel-
fare, integration must gradually include some federal or quasi-federal mechanisms. 
From the very beginning of the EU’s integration the founding fathers were aware 
that such aims could not be achieved through the classical mechanisms of interna-
tional organizations or confederations. On the other hand, the federalization of the 
internal relations between member states was unacceptable from the point of view 
of its legitimacy. It is for this reason that the question “How to go further?” has been 
the frequent follower of the integration process. 
Today, however, this question has another aroma. The surface has changed – 
there is no sufficient welfare guarantee for calm development. The hidden strate-
gic level has changed – there is no strategic consent on the necessary reform mea-
sures. The current crisis is for the first time a crisis of development which is creat-
ing an existential crisis for the whole integration project. Earlier crises were solved 
through different measures of internal constitutional engineering. This crisis looks 
for a new constitutional choice of constituencies, which is still on the horizon. Our 
article begins right at this point. 
We look at the crisis and the latest responses to it from the perspective of Nik-
las Luhmann’s systemic theory (Luhmann 1978). According to Luhmann, each so-
cial system must be able to reduce its complexity in order to survive in constantly 
changing surroundings. In order to reduce complexity, the system has to develop 
within its confines a certain autonomy and the capability to selectively process in-
formation and make comparisons with other alternatives (ibid.: 145). The major 
argument of this paper is that the reduction of complexity in the EU’s governing 
system has so far taken place through the constant isolation of the decision-mak-
ing process from politics. With the escalation of the Eurozone crisis, however, this 
reduction has for the first time been achieved not only at the expense of demands 
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coming from parliaments, street demonstrators, unions, euro-sceptic political par-
ties and constitutional courts, but also at the expense of demands coming from in-
dividual national governments regarding the most sensitive issues of fiscal policy. 
Nevertheless, given the loss of autonomy for both national and European institu-
tions to shape social and economic life, it has become impossible to discern who 
is responsible for the political vision embedded in the latest European anti-crisis 
measures. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely this invisibility of the power-hold-
er that gives stability to the system in the turbulent period of crisis. 
The article is organized in the following way. First, we explain the way the pro-
cess of European federalization has, step by step, isolated decision-making from 
the ideological battles taking place within member states’ political arenas without 
transferring those battles to the European level. Secondly, we demonstrate that it 
cannot be determined who should be blamed or credited for the profound social 
and economic consequences of the political project aimed at resolving the Euro-
zone crisis. Thirdly, we argue that the process of European federalization has failed 
in establishing an authentic European civil society; what’s more, this process has 
transformed national boundaries into nontransparent walls separating paralyzed 
national civil societies from each other and disabling them from communicating 
and commonly responding to European governmental measures. Finally, we sug-
gest there is an alternative way of reducing the system’s complexity: if the major 
EU architects decide to grant some competences back to the member states while at 
the same time empowering European institutions to efficiently regulate those poli-
cy areas which are necessary for maintaining European unity, power could again 
become effective and accountable to individuals both as member states’ citizens 
and as Europeans.
Hidden Federalization as an Instrument 
for Separating Politics from Policy-making
Through hidden federalism we consider the process of compound polity building in 
the shadow of the unresolved dilemma of the community’s finalité politique, under 
the technocratic mask of economic integration. This was the strategy embraced by 
the European post-WWII integrationist elites once they realized that the major in-
gredient for building a united Europe was desperately missing – the willingness of 
European peoples to give away their sovereignty and independence for the sake of 
the creation of a United States of Europe. The absence of politically self-aware Eu-
ropeans made Jean Monnet and his followers reject historically tested federal meth-
ods of community building (Burgess 1991: 27-39). Their solution for the problem 
of squaring the circle of European unity in diversity was to set off the integration 
process, which would slowly and invisibly separate policy-making from politics. In 
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order to implement this strategy it was necessary to establish a supranational go-
vernance sphere unchained by society’s demands. At the same time, the policy-
making process was to be removed step by step from member states’ national are-
nas of open and democratic political competition. In contrast to the US founding 
fathers, the proponents of European unification deliberately avoided open consti-
tutional debate on fundamental politico-philosophical issues, such as the relations 
between democracy and freedom, identity and political community or between the 
individual and system. Instead, they based the whole process on an undiscussed pre-
supposition1 that European integration represents a goal in itself.2 
This technocratic approach follows the basic premises of Niklas Luhmann’s 
systemic theory (Luhmann 1978). By making a decisive break with the Aristotelian 
tradition of political thinking, Luhmann has come to the conclusion that the search 
for a polity’s concrete purpose and meaning is simply out of step with social real-
ity (ibid.: 7). According to Luhmann it is no longer possible to integrate and hold 
together complex societies through normative structures (see also Habermas 1976: 
131). Standing on the firm ground of systemic theory, major European decision-
makers have bluntly rejected Altiero Spinelli’s proposal to let the people decide on 
the final aim of European integration in the course of a classical constitution-mak-
ing process (see Bartolini 2008). Instead, the European “cryptofederalists” have 
become indisputable promoters of the worldview according to which European in-
tegration represents peace, stability and welfare (Majone 2009: 81-90). The wide-
spread expectation that the Promised Land is waiting at the end of the integration 
road – lucidly described as “political messianism” by Joseph Weiler – has for a long 
time successfully regulated the actions of all important players participating in the 
integration process (Weiler 2012: 257-260). Simply put, integrationist elites have 
been led by a reasonable apprehension that citizens’ political participation in the 
building of Europe would make the governing system too complex and thus inca-
pable of sustaining the challenges coming from an unstable surrounding. For that 
reason, political decision-making has been conferred to the privileged interpreters 
of citizens’ best interests, i.e. national governments, the European Commission, the 
1 In his critique of Niklas Luhmann’s systemic theory of society Habermas emphasizes the im-
portance of the fact that Luhmann’s theory “proceeds from the undiscussed presupposition that 
the creation of motivation needed by the system is in no way restricted today by independent 
(eigensinnigen) systems of norms that follow a logic of their own, but responds to steering im-
peratives alone” (Habermas 1976: 130). 
2 This approach is best reflected in the words of Henry Spaak, Belgian statesman and one of 
the EU’s founding fathers: “Everything which tends toward European organizations is good” 
(quoted in Majone 2009: 73).
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Court of Justice and the most powerful organizations representing financial and 
business interests.3 
The strategy of Europe’s hidden federalization is best reflected in the way com-
petences were transferred from member states to the supranational power-holder. 
By deliberately avoiding to give an answer to the question of their project’s finalité 
politique, the major architects of the EU have also left unanswered the question of 
whether the EU resides on treaties or on a constitution, and consequently, who has 
the final word with regard to the vertical division of competences. This “revolution-
ary strategy of avoiding the answer to the question of finalité politique” (Kirchhof 
2006: 767) deprived the Union of a reliable guardian of the balance between the 
member states’ collective autonomy and the necessity of acting together at the Eu-
ropean level. In political reality the power to decide on who decides has been con-
ferred to national governments, the Commission and the Court of Justice (Weiler 
1999: 10-101). As for the national governments, they have for a long time perceived 
the centralization of competences at the European level as a chance to avoid do-
mestic democratic control and to enlarge the scope of their unaccountable politi-
cal action. As for the Commission and the Court of Justice, they have always been 
firmly determined to deepen the integration process, despite the occasional inertia 
of member states. Consequently, the power to shape the fine balance between the 
democratic demand for collective self-determination of European peoples and effi-
ciency improvement-driven demand for a higher level of European unity has fallen 
into untrustworthy hands (Scharpf 2009). 
Within a politically unfinished and highly heterogeneous community such as 
the EU, the economic, social and political organization of society essentially de-
pends on a vertical division of governing tasks. With each further step in the process 
of establishing a common market and monetary union, member states’ democrati-
cally elected authorities are being deprived of the necessary autonomy to protect 
domestic industry by trade barriers, subsidizing economic growth, influencing ex-
port and import by changing inflation rates, determining minimal wage, retirement 
age, the level of expenditure for social and health care and the educational system, 
etc. This means that every decision on the vertical transfer of competences should 
be considered as an actualization of a concrete political vision. Within democratic 
nation states political leaders are obliged to search for democratic support for their 
political projects in elections. In the EU, however, the advocates of the worldview 
3 “In fact without a competition for political power, the EU is closer to a form of enlightened 
despotism than a genuine democracy. Enlightened despotism is a form of government which 
emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century, where monarchs agreed to consult representative 
bodies (the early parliaments) and were limited by constitutional rules and judicial bodies, and so 
generally enacted policies that promoted the interests of their citizens” (Hix 2008: 85).
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according to which it is necessary to constantly deepen the integration process to 
the detriment of member states’ autonomy, remain invisible, unaccountable and re-
leased from any substantial political control. If the establishment of an “ever closer 
union among European peoples” is conceived as a goal in itself, the question of the 
division of competences loses its political and ideological nature. It becomes a tri-
vial technical issue of finding the most efficient way of attaining the “undiscussed” 
goal – the unification of Europe. 
The European Parliament is usually perceived as the guarantor of democracy in 
the EU. However, constant growth in the Parliament’s competences has not resulted 
in the establishment of a direct link between the society’s demands and the suprana-
tional decision-making sphere. The simple fact that the Parliament neither chooses 
the European government nor determines its political agenda deprives voters of the 
possibility to influence policy-making and choose political leaders (Hix 2008: 76-85). 
Thus, it might seem that the European Parliament only gives a false impression of 
democratic participation. However, the illusion of citizens’ democratic participation 
should be understood as a tool for enlarging the scope of the European governance 
process. Ever since the Single European Act, treaty changes enabling the penetration 
of European decisions into the ever more sensitive spheres of citizens’ economic and 
social life have been followed by a strengthening of the Parliament’s legislative role. 
By putting the ideological mask of representative democracy over the European 
governance process the EU architects have actually sought to enlarge the scope of 
the supranational sphere of decision-making.
More importantly, the uncontrolled transfer of competences to the supranational 
institutions has substantially diminished the sphere of citizens’ influence on national 
policy-making (Schmidt 2009: 19-24). Consequently, national democratic compe-
titions between liberals, social democrats, conservatives and socialists have been 
gradually transformed into fiction. Paradoxically, in sharp contrast to their original 
purpose, parliaments within the EU decision-making system have been transformed 
into tools for separating policy-making from politics. With the escalation of the Eu-
rozone crisis it has become evident that the outcomes of the parliamentary elections 
no longer determine a member state’s most sensitive political choices such as the 
privatization of public functions, the great diminishing of expenditure for health and 
education, social care, or the flexibility of the labour market (Krastev 2012). 
The level of separation of the governing process that has attained so far from 
the potentially clashing demands of a highly heterogeneous continental-scale soci-
ety would be unimaginable for a classic liberal-democratic state. For the line of rea-
soning developed in this paper the two following consequences play a major role:
First, in parallel to the deepening of the integration process the major decision-
makers have become ever less politically accountable. As Joseph Weiler says, “it is 
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difficult to point to a single instance of accountability for political failure as distinct 
from personal accountability for misconduct in the annals of European integration” 
(Weiler 2012: 252). While European decisions were ever more visibly shaping citi-
zens’ everyday life, decision-makers were becoming ever less visible. As policy-
making has migrated from national arenas to the supranational power-holder, it has 
become less reliable to ascribe political responsibility to one of the dispersed cen-
ters of power within the EU – national governments, representatives of big busi-
ness, national parliaments and constitutional courts, the European Parliament, the 
European Central Bank, the Court of Justice or Commission. Who is responsible for 
the fact that in Cyprus citizens were for some period deprived of the basic economic 
right to freely dispose of the salaries and pensions they had deposited in banks (Ha-
limi 2013)? Or for the fact that in Greece persons with chronic illnesses are losing 
their right to free medicine (Noelle 2011)? Should national governments be blamed 
for too easily accepting the establishment of a common market and monetary union 
as treaty goals? Is it the fault of the European Central Bank, whose decisions are 
made independently from the political will of the member states, the Council and 
the Parliament? Should the Commission be blamed for strongly pushing the inte-
gration process forward, without fail, to the detriment of the member states’ autono-
my (see Majone 2009: 72-99)? Should the EU Court of Justice be blamed for slowly 
transforming international treaties into a European constitution (see Stone 2004)? 
Should we blame the world’s strongest financial and crediting organizations, whose 
ex-employees have become prime ministers overnight in member states confronted 
with enormous public debts (Geuens 2012)? Is it the fault of member states’ con-
stitutional courts that remained only grudging spectators to the erosion of national 
constitutional democracy (see recently Grimm 2009)? Or, should the citizens be 
blamed, whose “permissive consent” has opened the door for their elites to autono-
mously shape the destiny of Europe? The fact that the answer to these pertinent 
questions is missing reflects the most important consequence of Europe’s hidden 
federalization.
The second consequence of the hidden federalization method is that the pro-
cess of economic, administrative and political supranational integration has not 
been followed by a rise in solidarity among European peoples (Hooghe, Marks 
2008). In the time of common market building, while the integration was being per-
ceived as beneficial by all interested actors, the issues of solidarity and of collective 
European identity could have been easily ignored. It was not until the escalation of 
the Eurozone crisis that the absence of a collective European identity became a tan-
gible threat to the predictable functioning of the system. Ever since the first open 
manifestations of the crisis people have firmly rejected sacrificing their national 
economic interests for the sake of a common European future. So, the crisis has 
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jeopardized the essential condition of success for Monnet’s depoliticized method of 
integration – the suddenly worsened conditions of social and economic life within 
member states have awakened citizens from their sleepy phase of indifference with 
regard to European integration (De Wilde, Zürn 2012). The important question of 
a just distribution of wealth between European peoples as well as between national 
and transnational classes has been successfully avoided by the hidden federalization 
process for decades. Today this question is being posed in the streets and in elec-
toral campaigns (ibid.). But there is no answer. Paralyzed by the factual demand for 
consensual decision-making in all politically sensitive areas, European institutions 
have proven themselves ill-equipped to deal with the issue of distributive justice. 
On the other hand, while disposing of adequate institutional instruments for making 
collectively binding decisions in the fields of social and fiscal policy, member states 
have lost the necessary level of autonomy to actually do so, precisely thanks to the 
success of the hidden federalization process. Consequently, the crisis has revealed 
the weakening of member states’ capacity to integrate their societies through politi-
cal decision-making. Apart from the recent violent manifestations on the streets of 
southern European capitals, this tendency is best reflected in the rise of secession-
ism within the multinational states (Guibernau 2012, Keating 2012). 
The rise of awareness among citizens that the integration is beneficial for some 
states and social classes to the detriment of others has paralyzed European govern-
ing elites in their efforts to achieve consensus on the best way of resolving the crisis 
(see Bellamy 2012: 150-151). From the perspective of Luhmann’s systemic theory 
it turned out that the main cause of today’s crisis is to be found in the lack of govern-
ing autonomy at the European level to select demands coming from individual na-
tional governments, now constrained by clear mandates of their awakened citizens, 
national parliaments, unions, constitutional courts or thousands of angry citizens on 
the streets of Athens, Madrid, Rome, etc. 
The Crisis and the Responses to It – the Rise of the EU’s 
Invisible Holder of the Truth
A crisis is a condition which seeks a decision not yet reached: a decision not only on 
the way to get out of the crisis, but also a decision which provides the content and 
the political purpose of systemic reforms. What is certain, however, is that the end 
of the crisis is imminent; even though it cannot be determined when this will occur 
(Kozelek 1997: 175). According to the historical experience of compound commu-
nities, a decision-maker resolving the crisis could be a victorious power in a civil 
war, like Lincoln’s army of the North in the US civil war 1861-1865, or it could be 
a democratically elected president as was the case in the US crisis in the 1930s. If 
it takes too long to make this kind of a fundamental decision, the usual result is the 
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paralysis of the governing system, as was the case in Yugoslavia. The EU’s experi-
ence of dealing with the crisis does not resemble any of these well-known historical 
cases. It is hard to deny that the EU’s member states’ visions of the final aim and the 
meaning of the integration process are essentially clashing (Schmidt 2009: 19-24). 
Yet, a decision on the EU’s political nature favoring the interests of some states and 
social classes to the detriment of others is obviously being made (see Scharpf 2009, 
Bellamy 2012) – despite the fact that any kind of war option is excluded and despite 
the fact that the EU’s institutions cannot base their decisions on the will of the ma-
jority of Europeans. So two questions arise: First, how is this decision being made? 
And second, who is actually making it? 
With the escalation of the Eurozone crisis it has become evident that the Euro-
pean decision-making process concerning the most sensitive policy fields, such as 
fiscal and social policy, has been rapidly separated from the demands coming from 
individual member states. The dismissal of insufficiently cooperative political elites 
in member states (Papandreou in Greece and Berlusconi in Italy) was only an intro-
duction to the systemic reforms that would essentially change the political nature of 
the EU. Namely, it was the adoption of the Six-Pack regulation4 in November 2011 
and the Fiscal treaty in March 2012 that eventually destroyed the state of equilib-
rium between the need for European unity and democratic demand for the preserva-
tion of member states’ autonomy. 
The Excessive Imbalance Procedure de facto empowers the Commission to 
control the most sensitive fields of fiscal and social policy-making within mem-
ber states.5 The Commission first defines a rather detailed list of macroeconomic 
performance indicators, such as the three year average of current account balance, 
net international investment position, real effective exchange rate, export market 
shares, nominal unit labour cost, deflated housing prices, private sector credit flow, 
private sector debt, general government debt and unemployment rate. At the same 
time, specific upper and lower “alert thresholds” for each country are defined au-
tonomously from the political will of the respective member state’s democratic 
authorities.6 If a state fails to keep the aforementioned indicators within the al-
lowed thresholds, the government is asked to implement macroeconomic reforms 
in accordance with the Commission’s recommendation. If the state fails to respond 
to the Commission’s demands, it will be facing serious financial sanctions, again 
4 Council Directive 2011/85/EU, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011, Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011, Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011, Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, Regulation (EU) 
No 1177/2011.
5 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
6 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/documents/alert_mechanism_re-
port_2012_en.pdf, accessed 10 May 2013.
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determined by the Commission. Even though the Council preserves the possibility 
to prevent the implementation of sanctions by qualified majority voting, the state 
in question has no right to vote on this issue as a Council member. In contrast to 
the situation when the Council and Parliament decide on general rules regulating 
member states’ behavior, this procedure gives the Council an opportunity to decide 
on the justifiability of some member state’s concrete economic policy (see Scharpf 
2012: 28-29). This means that a democratically unaccountable supranational deci-
sion-maker is given large maneuvering space to judge the most sensitive national 
political decisions, such as determining a minimum wage, relations in the labour 
market, the privatization of public functions, the retirement age, and cutting expen-
ditures for health, education and social care. Furthermore, this solution obviously 
jeopardizes the formal division of competences defined by the European treaties, 
according to which fiscal and social policy should remain the exclusive competen-
ces of member states. 
Furthermore, by ratifying the Fiscal Compact, member states have taken the 
obligation to make the so-called “golden rule” – budget deficit below 3% of GDP 
and public debt below 60% of GDP – a part of their national constitutions.7 Con-
sequently, national political competitions between different normative projects for 
dealing with the crisis have become senseless. Simply put, the potential decision of 
some future authentically socialist government to change social and fiscal policy 
by investing into big infrastructural projects, by spending more money for the im-
provement of social and health care or the educational system will be easily over-
turned by the state’s constitutional court (McGiffen 2011). 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the historical experience of federal systems, 
the most striking peculiarity of this tendency of reducing the EU member states’ 
self-rule is that it has not been accompanied by an improvement in the conditions 
for shared rule. Namely, the Fiscal Compact has not resulted in the establishment 
of a powerful European economic government. The autonomy to shape a socie-
ty’s economic and social life, which has been taken away from the member states, 
has not been conferred to some politically accountable European authority. Instead, 
the Fiscal Compact has only reinforced already existing control mechanisms at the 
supranational level, and introduced some new ones.8 Notwithstanding the obvi-
ous improvement of their monitoring and implementing roles, the Parliament and 
7 Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union, Art. 
3.2.
8 Apart from the strengthening of the Commission’s surveying competences, the treaty has intro-
duced the possibility for a member state to raise the case against another member state before the 
Court of Justice for not complying with fiscal discipline rules. Treaty on stability, coordination 
and governance in the economic and monetary union, Art. 8.
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Commission have been almost completely excluded from the political decision-
making on the best way of getting out of the crisis. Instead of being a source of 
ideas and political leadership, the Commission has only proven to be “faithful and 
effective as ‘His Master’s Voice’” (Weiler 2012: 254). What’s more, the Council 
itself has been deprived of its traditional role as the key decision-maker in the EU; 
instead, it has been transformed into “an elaborate rubber stamp to the Union’s two 
Presidents – Merkel and Sarkozy” (ibid.). In parallel to the weakening of the EU’s 
traditional supranational/intergovernmental decision-making structure, the power 
of the European Council was rapidly growing (Habermas 2012: VII). As the crisis 
was escalating, the unusually frequent meetings of heads of states and governments 
have become occasions when the most sensitive political decisions – directly or in-
directly determining wages in the public and private sector, privatization, pension 
reforms, and employment in public sector, etc. – were being made behind closed 
doors (Deloire, Dubois 2012). 
These recent transformations of both the EU and its member states obviously 
rest on a very concrete political vision.9 German sociologist Ulrich Beck has re-
cently singled out the German chancellor as the main promoter of this new vision of 
the European Union (Beck 2012, see also Schönberger 2012). The major conclusion 
of his latest book German Europe seems rather radical: Not only that Europe is be-
coming German, but the truth itself is becoming German, truth which is actualized 
in the form of a policy of austerity (Beck 2013: 57).10 At first glance, this conclu-
sion seems very puzzling in today’s era of mature constitutionalism. Citizens have 
the formal possibility to shape their collective destiny by participating in national 
and European elections. They also have a constitutionally assured right to strike 
and to organize massive street protests in order to make the authorities reconsider 
some important political choices. Nevertheless, all attempts so far to change the 
current way of dealing with the crisis by changing the government’s policy through 
elections (France, Italy), or by organizing numerous strikes and massive street pro-
tests (Athens, Madrid, Rome) have proven to be fruitless. So far, the national con-
stitutional courts have proven to be the strongest barrier to the uniform European 
rules which jeopardize basic principles of trust and solidarity in member states. 
Several times in the last three years the Constitutional Court of Portugal has reject-
ed national austerity measures demanded by the European Commission, European 
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund.11 Nevertheless, not only have these 
decisions of the Portuguese Constitutional Court provoked dissatisfaction from 
9 This new vision of the EU was recently called “a Union of rules” (Maduro 2012: 8-10).
10 This citation, which does not appear in the original German edition, can be found in the Italian 
edition of the book that was published in 2013 (Beck 2013).
11 https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/09/port-a09.html
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European and German officials, but they also preceded immediate growth in the 
interest rates on Portugal’s 10-year bonds.12 This gives us a hint of what would hap-
pen if constitutional courts continued to protect national constitutional identities by 
contradicting the uniform understanding of the common interest of all Europeans – 
this would most probably result in the rapid growth of public debt followed by the 
escalation of economic, social and political instability. 
In the period of the world economic crisis, a depoliticized supranational go-
vernance system like the EU simply cannot function predictably if it is obliged to 
fulfill demands coming from individual national governments, parliaments, unions, 
street protests or constitutional courts. Consequently, there remain only two options 
for avoiding the system’s paralysis. The first is to make supranational authority de-
mocratically accountable and autonomous enough to select society’s demands in 
the most sensitive fields of distributive justice. The second way is to completely 
isolate the governance process from the democratic sphere where different political 
projects compete for citizens’ support. From this then it follows that the EU’s major 
decision-makers have chosen the second path. By logical necessity, however, this 
presupposes the existence of an interpreter of the common interest of all Europeans, 
whose decisions can prevent further aggravating the economic, social and political 
situation. In 16th and 17th century Europe, it was the decision of absolutistic mon-
archs that saved societies from the chaos of religious and civil wars. The triumph of 
the principle cuius regio eius religio meant that all disputes about what is just, good 
and beautiful were to be moved from the public to the private sphere. By isolating 
the governance process from the confronted demands of religious communities, the 
absolute ruler gained sufficient autonomy to establish order, peace and stability. In 
parallel to the liberation of the ruler from the obligation to respond to conflicting re-
ligious worldviews that were tearing society apart, his responsibility for the collec-
tive destiny of its subjects was growing (Kozelek 1997: 70). The survival of today’s 
EU in its current form will also depend on the success of the European leaders’ at-
tempts to completely isolate the governance process from different visions concern-
ing the right way to shape the relations between state and society, politics and the 
market, collective and individual autonomy. Nevertheless, one thing essentially dif-
ferentiates today’s situation from the period of establishing absolute monarchies: 
the invisibility of today’s truth-holder. The fact that austerity policy has its strongest 
promoter in German political and financial elite has led Ulrich Beck to the conclu-
sion that the German chancellor represents the EU’s new Principe (Beck 2012: 45-
57). Nevertheless, the institutional instruments for determining who is politically 
responsible for decisions on which Europe’s social, economic and political stability 
essentially depend are simply absent from today’s EU. While Beck could speculate 
12 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304367204579268620744447600
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on who holds the ultimate decision-making power, he could hardly prove his thesis 
by pointing to some concrete and visible centre of power within the EU.
In contrast to the obvious legal and institutional accountability of the abso-
lute monarch, the responsibility of today’s European power-holder cannot be deter-
mined. Despite the fact that the austerity policy advocated by the German govern-
ment vitally affects the lives of citizens in all member states, the German chancellor 
is legally and politically responsible only to the Germans (see Mueller 2013). It 
follows that Europe has come to a rather paradoxical situation: the original sense 
and meaning of formal equality of member states, democratic mechanisms with-
in member states, the national and European parliaments, national constitutional 
courts and the Court of Justice have been essentially changed – they have been 
transformed into an invisibility cloak for the supranational power-holder. Deprived 
of a right to protest against the monarch, to associate, to freely speak, to democrati-
cally choose their representatives in legislative chambers, to restrict political power 
through courts’ decisions, subjects of states under absolute rule have transferred all 
political and legal responsibility for community’s collective destiny to the absolute 
monarch. As for today’s Europeans, they simply remain helpless in attempts to dis-
tinguish who should be blamed for the serious worsening of their life conditions. 
The Italians, Greeks, and Portuguese can hold politically and legally responsible 
only their national governments – which citizens can change endlessly without, 
however, having any success in changing actual policy (Krastev 2012-2013). Mas-
sive movements enjoining undivided support of the whole society, as is the case for 
Spanish “Indignados”, can relentlessly protest against the politics of eliminating 
welfare state functions without even the slightest success in changing actual poli-
cies. Constitutional courts can occasionally reject some national decisions aimed at 
the implementation of some European policies, without, though, being able to re-
strict the power of those who actually make policy choices. The Commission can 
propose reforms which are in sharp contrast to the actual anti-crisis strategy, but the 
strategy remains the same (Siđanski 2011). When going to the Euro summits, na-
tional leaders can make firm promises to their constituencies that they will change 
European policies by adapting them to their national interest, but the policy remains 
the same (Bulard 2013). Thus, the EU’s invisible power-holder has acquired an ide-
al position. The implementation of its political will is impossible to restrain while 
its political and legal responsibility is impossible to determine. 
Towards a Diagnosis: the Basic Lack of Societal Control Mechanisms
So far, we have discussed the EU’s lack of systemic actors with the capacity to pre-
vent, as well as to fight, the current crisis. More than that, we spoke about a newly 
emerging phenomenon – the establishment of an invisible power-holder delivering 
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anti-crisis solutions to EU institutions and member states. Instead of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand of the market that was supposed to guide the integration process, the 
invisible hand of the power elite has become such a guide. The real system of hid-
den federalism has been transformed into a real system of hidden leadership. This 
phenomenon exposes the depth of the EU crisis, which is not only functional, but 
also structural. The invisible leadership of the EU has been released from control by 
both formal EU institutions and the European civic sphere. 
What is apparent in the attempts at crisis resolution (in the last six years) is that 
the exclusive players were the systemic actors of the EU – the European Council, 
ECOFIN, the Commission, and Summit of Eurozone – and that the role of social 
actors has been completely neglected. Nevertheless, the exclusion of social actors 
is simply taken for granted among EU observers. According to the dominant world-
view shared by both academics and common people, the “social actors” are simply 
ill-equipped to contribute to crisis-resolution. Mentioning “social actors”, however, 
we do not discuss the issue of crisis-resolution, but the issue of viable controlling 
mechanisms over the decision-makers in crises. The EU has so far developed sys-
temic control mechanisms of a kind – legal, political, administrative ones – but not 
a general one based on the model of civil society. While the systemic integration has 
been taking place over more than sixty years, there was no corresponding process of 
social integration. The latter predominantly remained within the national societies 
of the member states, which could not react properly to the supranational implica-
tions of the integration process.13
The functional differentiation between society and state is a fundamental fea-
ture of modern political communities. It guarantees autonomy of both sides – go-
vernmental autonomy for the state and productive autonomy (in the widest sense) 
on the side of the society. The whole idea of rule of law could not have been mate-
rialized in the absence of a strong and compact civil society, whose vital interests 
needed protection in the form of viable legal and institutional guarantees, but also in 
the form of society’s immanent mechanisms of the control of power such as public 
opinion, civic initiatives and civil disobedience (see Riedel 1974: 719-800). What 
characterizes the original role of the citizen as a building block of civil society is 
her active role in public life. Unlike nationality, which exists as a legal connection 
between the individual and the state, citizenship reflects a political connection be-
tween the individual and the state. The first represents the passive role of the indi-
vidual (status passives) but the latter her active role (status actives). Just as derived 
13 Differentiation between systemic integration and societal integration comes from Habermas’s 
analyses of the “late capitalism” in the 1970s. It could be fruitful for the analyses of the crisis en-
vironment of the Union since it provokes the crucial legitimacy issue of compound governmental 
systems of the Western world including the EU (see Habermas 1976: 1-8).
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from the active, dynamic relationship of the citizen vis-à-vis the state, the right of 
participation became the crucial feature of modern democracy. By its origin, to par-
ticipate meant not only the presence of citizens’ representatives in decision-making 
bodies (such as legislation), but also participation in the public sphere of political 
society as a realm functionally separated from the state. In a word, the crucial role 
of such a public sphere consists of the permanent public control of the government 
(see Habermas 1992: 647). 
The European Union, or more precisely its predecessors, the three Communi-
ties, originated as a systemic integration of the common market. The declared aim 
of the European Economic Community (1957) was the integrated internal market. 
By the achievement of this aim at the end of the 1980s the apolitical market society 
had been rounded off. It had become a society without its own (inherent) political 
citizenship. Differently than the typical “European model” that was internally di-
vided along state-nation borders, the latter integration process that took place within 
the same historical and geographical space did not create a political society of indi-
viduals conscious of their needs and interests vis-à-vis the newly created system of 
government. Hence, the social substance of the European citizen did not originate. 
This means that Europe’s hidden federalism has produced an integrated institutional 
system without its own social equivalent which has been captured within divided 
citizenship. However, while a societal integration within the EEC/EU has not been 
taking place, the systemic integration of the (market) society has been progressing 
in full harmony with its declared aims. The empty space between the non-existent 
society and the existent governing system has been fulfilled though a surrogate pub-
lic sphere based on the “permissive consensus”.
With the escalation of the big crisis14 it has become evident that power-hold-
ers within the EU can no longer count on permissive consensus. Today, there are 
actually many indications of civil resistance towards different measure-packages. 
However, within the social structure of practical disobedience there is not even a 
trace of “European citizenship”. There is not any transnational synchronization, not 
to speak of organization, of the protests. That’s why there is no visible strategy to-
wards an alternative project that would be offered to the EU decision-maker from 
some engaged European public. Numerous nationally expressed protests are far 
from becoming one systemic resisting opposition to European citizenship. Having 
14 It is possible to call the current crisis a big one since it encompasses not only the functioning 
of particular sectors of the system but also its vital mechanisms. The crisis started in 2005 after 
the collapse of the Constitutional Treaty project and manifested itself as a decline in citizens’ 
confidence. The financial crisis of 2008, which is still going on, disturbed the institutional foun-
dations of the system and opened the quest of its future (Taylor 2008, Hix 2008, Majone 2009, 
Habermas 2012, Beck 2012). 
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such an action deficit in mind, one can easily conclude that the crisis environment 
does not produce even a learning opportunity for the nationally divided popula-
tion. On the contrary, one can notice the tendency of re-nationalization in the mas-
sive public reaction against the anti-crisis measures. As opposed to the institutional 
system and its hidden power-holder there is nobody who would represent a corre-
sponding systemic reaction of citizens and their associations – no media, no trade 
unions, no political parties, nor any civic organization – in a word, nobody who 
would resist the rising process of authoritarian decision-making at the European 
level. Instead of being politically motivated to react, the citizenship of the EU has 
been frozen in its very rudimentary position. 
The population of the EU is characterized today by a visible trend towards the 
re-nationalization of citizenship (see Bellamy 2012: 151-157). Underdeveloped at 
the European level, EU citizenship is witnessing the tendency of reunion around 
national elites. Citizens expect their representatives at EU institutions to defend pri-
marily national interests in terms of employment, of the postponement and relief of 
public debt repayment, of more egalitarian social and education policy. All of this is 
taking place in the moment when there is no consensus on strategies of crisis solu-
tion or on economic development. Such a reaction by citizens is totally opposed to 
the idea of European citizenship. 
Today’s crisis is primarily a systemic crisis of integration, which finds its 
strongest incentive in the public financing of the member states. But, it did not 
start in this area. Particularly in the economic and monetary union, some inher-
ent dysfunction of the system was already apparent from the very beginning of 
its implementation. An inefficient and procedurally complicated open method of 
coordination, also being implemented in other areas of public policy, presented 
deep systemic problems. The current efforts to solve the crisis are directed at this, 
the systemic (governmental) level of EU existence.15 For instance, a great issue of 
strengthening member states’ budget control by the EU institutions represents just 
one issue of the new governing procedures within the existing systemic integra-
tion. It is, mutatis mutandis, the case with regard to the introduction of some kind 
of fiscal federalism, although still in the phase of preliminary discussion between 
systemic actors. 
These currents, however, have a limited effect on the affirmation of the soci-
etal integration within the EU. Simultaneously, with proposed or adopted systemic 
measures there is no rise in the feeling of belonging among citizens to some com-
monwealth of cross-border space. What is worse, it seems that the set of values and 
15 The Treaty on stabilization, coordination and governing (2012), corresponding Treaty on sta-
bilization mechanism (2012), measures directed to overall banking control (so-called banking 
union, 2013) six-package measures (2011), all of them are typical governing measures. 
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the normative structure, which originated in the eighties and was maintained in the 
nineties, has been melting under the systemic disputes and under the consequences 
of new systemic solutions. 
Today, the so-called “common European values” is a topic only among top po-
liticians or the EU’s civil servants that serves for some form of ritual use. Actually, 
it is also a topic of scholars who are gradually less capable of interpreting the EU’s 
political nature beyond abstract theoretical or practically hermetic jargon. What was 
supposed to bind the people who have lived for decades under the same institutional 
roof and under the same rules of political behavior in a common feeling of belong-
ing, has simply disappeared at the Union’s most critical moment. 
What Could be Done in Terms of Constitutional Intervention?
The main problem with civil society as a fundamental guard against alienation of 
political power from citizens is that such a structure cannot simply be created. It 
can originate only as a form of society that produces itself in the societal spheres 
of material, cultural and moral reproduction, as an outcome of the spontaneous rise 
of normative and symbolic structures in the polity (Weber 1963, Ferguson 1767). It 
means that the building up of civil society is not at the disposal of political elites’ 
activity. The historical deficit of European civil society should, however, pay atten-
tion to the deep structural gap between the enormous complex of governing institu-
tions, rules and procedures on the one side and the failure of corresponding societal 
integration on the other. We have noticed that the long-lasting effect of the Euro-
crisis has not set in motion a learning process among European citizens that could 
come from some cross-border resistance of the population against unpopular politi-
cal measures.16 
Contrary to the construction of civil society, the institutional reforms actually 
stand at the disposal of political actors. However, what major European political 
actors did in the last four-to-five years did not contribute to overcoming the crisis 
in terms of raising the functional rationality of the system, even setting aside the 
widespread unpopularity of reform outcomes. Since the introduction of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union and its enlargement, both in the first half of the first 
decade, the governing system of the EU became overly complex in comparison to 
its governing capacities. Or, observed from the other side, the governing capacities 
of the existing system, in spite of its changes in the Nice Treaty (2003), have not be-
come sufficiently functional to satisfy the increased interest and preferences of the 
16 For instance, enforcing the temporary prime-minister to Greece and Italy in 2010 by the invis-
ible hand of high EU instances and global corporation, such as Goldman Sachs, was a real oc-
casion for protests throughout the EU, not only in the two intervened countries. As it happened, 
the defense of democratic procedures was at the moment only the task of Greeks and Italians. 
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growing and more differentiated actors. The crisis of 2008 has enlarged the internal 
systems’ tensions, but the simultaneous activities directed in treaty changes did not 
contribute to adequate functional changes.17 
Today it is obvious that the EU cannot endure the existing scope of the sys-
tem’s complexity, particularly its ambitious goal to become a regional, at least Eu-
ropean in the continental sense, structure of might. There is an unwritten rule in the 
history of empires and compound states – the more complex a polity, the more sim-
plification of rule it needs. This unwritten rule is confirmed by the system theory of 
society and the premise that in some phase (degree) of complexity a system must 
take measures to reduce complexity for the sake of remaining functional (see Luh-
mann 1978: 127-283). 
The major argument of this paper is that the EU’s governing elites have so far 
attempted to reduce the system’s complexity by selecting demands coming from in-
dividual member states according to the criteria of the EU’s invisible power-holder. 
However, the question arises: is there another way of reducing the governing sys-
tem’s excessive complexity that would not completely ignore the demand for deci-
sion-makers’ democratic accountability?
First of all, the EU could and should reduce its competences. Today one can 
hardly find a public activity or a sector that is not under some form of the EU’s ju-
risdiction. Almost every part of public life within the member states is under its ex-
clusive, shared (divided), coordinating, supporting and supplementing competen-
ces in accordance to their classification in the Lisbon Treaty. Some layman would 
suppose that there is a ubiquitous predomination of the EU institutions over those 
of the member states. In fact, the member states, as the masters of treaties, have 
transferred all those competences to the EU, under different executing regimes. 
But within each of the legally existing executing regimes they succeeded to keep 
decision-making under their firm control. The output of the governing process is 
generally determined by the executive branches of power, both at the European and 
member state levels. Such a tendency has been apparent from the very beginning 
of the integration process, but today, with the endless complexity of the system and 
multitude of competences, the system is steadily becoming uncontrollable and fa-
tally undemocratic.
Having that in mind, a clearer delimitation of the competences between two 
levels of government based on a corresponding model of dual federalism could 
contribute to a reduction of its complexity. Roughly speaking, the EU level would 
17 For example, the Lisbon Treaty maintained a mechanism of open method coordination, al-
though it practically collapsed in its attempts at controlling the economic policies of the member 
states during its introduction at the beginning of the first decade. That’s why new measures and 
procedures had to be taken during the last couple of years. 
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maintain all existing competences encompassing the common market, trade policy 
and monetary policy. A new power over some elements of fiscal policy would be 
added to the European level of governance because it should finally acquire a mini-
mum of financial autonomy vis-à-vis member states (see also Maduro 2012). All 
these areas of competences would be put under the EU level regulatory regime. All 
other areas of governmental regulatory activities would remain in the hands of the 
member states. Shared (divided) competences would be maintained only in some 
areas of common interest, such as agricultural, regional policies and policy on sci-
entific and technological development, all of them in the regime of the redistribu-
tive policy of the EU. Matters concerning a space of freedom, security and justice, 
as well as a common foreign, security and defense policy would remain within the 
current intergovernmental regime. 
This kind of proposal, dealing with the vertical division of powers, would con-
tribute to the corresponding reforms concerning the horizontal separation of power 
at the EU level. The prevailing concept of “governing without government” cannot 
satisfy the need for more efficiency and transparency among EU institutions.18 In 
this respect it is necessary to strengthen the Commission’s role as a kind of “eco-
nomic government” of the EU. Its legitimacy would be strengthened through more 
direct electoral ties with the European Parliament, i.e. with its winning majority. 
Aside from that, the commissioners in the areas of economic development, financ-
ing and foreign economic relations would have a rank similar to the ministers in 
the member state governments. This would practically clarify the issue of account-
ability at the EU level that deals with crucial aspects of the crisis and the shaping of 
further economic development of the Union.
These proposals are by no means of a technical kind. They possess a political 
substance and push the systemic reforms towards the politicization of public poli-
cies and politics within the Union (see also Hix 2008: 87-178). As such, they could 
only be a consequence of some public political will in a wider spectrum of political 
actors. Political will is a crucial internal factor in the public life of a polity. It simply 
exists or does not exist. Testing the institutions’ ability for change means testing the 
chances of some political community for surviving. 
Conclusion: The EU as Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon
In the course of history rulers have always been inclined to remain out of sight of 
the subjects they rule (see Bobbio 1987: 79-97). Classical political thinkers, such 
as Plato or Bodin, have convincingly argued that a ruler has the right to deceive 
18 There is a similar assessment in the editorial article “European Parliament Elections: Europe’s 
Fateful Choices”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, no. 3, p. 748.
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its subjects in the same manner as a doctor has the right to lie to his patients and 
a father must sometimes lie to his children (ibid.: 89). As a counter balance to se-
cret decision-making processes, the monarch’s responsibility for the life and death 
of its subjects was always glaringly visible (Foucault 1995: 32-73). In contrast to 
the absolute monarchy, the ideal of democracy represented the public rule of pub-
lic power. In modern democratic nation-states the visibility of the ruling process is 
guaranteed by constitutional procedures defining the way political authority is to be 
established and constraining the exercise of political power. But who holds deci-
sion-making power within a compound supranational community that is no longer 
a confederation of democratic states, but has not yet become a democratic state it-
self? As this paper shows, in the EU political power is certainly removed from the 
democratic institutions of individual member states. At the same time, though, the 
power has not been conferred to the EU’s traditional supranational and intergovern-
mental institutions. In parallel to the deepening of the integration process, power 
has been slowly transferred into the sphere of invisibility. The consequences of the 
invisibility of the power-holder within the EU, as an unintended outcome of the 
hidden federalization process, have become obvious since the escalation of the Eu-
rozone crisis in 2009. 
Political thinkers, long ago, came to the conclusion that invisible and all-seeing 
power is the most efficient form of power. Jeremy Bentham’s model of Panopticon 
is usually considered to be an ideal ruling mechanism enabling power to be all-see-
ing and invisible at the same time (ibid.: 195-228). “Each individual, in his place, is 
securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; 
but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He 
is seen but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in com-
munication. The arrangement of his room, opposite the central tower, imposes on 
him axial visibility; but the division of the ring, those separated cells, imply a late-
ral invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of the order” (underlined by B. 
K.) (ibid.: 200). In the EU, political authority which decides on essential issues for 
citizens’ everyday lives is indeed removed from the sight of the European peoples. 
Furthermore, the analogy between individuals captured within their cells whose 
side walls prevent them from communicating with each other and European peo-
ples imprisoned by their national confines is striking. However, unlike the imagined 
supervisor of Bentham’s Panopticon, the European invisible power-holder is hardly 
all-seeing. This is his greatest weakness. Neither was the absolute ruler even close 
to all-seeing; yet, he managed to establish order by the publicly performed atrocities 
of punishing mechanisms, enabling a power to be “recharged in the ritual display 
of its reality as ‘super power’” (ibid.: 57). Furthermore, today’s European pow-
er-holder faces much more challenging demands in its effort to regulate society’s 
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economic life in an age of rapid globalization. So, unpredictable turbulence and 
challenges, such as a new crisis in the world’s financial system, might easily conti-
nue to undermine the system’s capacity to function predictably, even after the fac-
tual abolishment of national democracies and the establishment of durable asym-
metric relations of power between the member states. 
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